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Abstract:  The aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of body developed by Luhmann’s 
systems theory. Privileged places where one can look for the body will be the interpenetration 
between human beings and the concept of socialization. Another fundamental problem is the 
relationship between semantics and body, although the most explicit presence of the body in 
this theory comes with the concept of symbiotic mechanisms or symbols. The last place where 
this enquiry will look for a bodily reference are emotions, which were highly ignored by 
Luhmann. Alternative approaches explored in the paper are treating the body as a structure, as a 
medium or as an internal environment. 
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Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el concepto de cuerpo desarrollado por la 
teoría de sistemas de Luhmann. Algunos lugares privilegiados para encontrar al cuerpo en este 
contexto son la interpenetración entre seres humanos y el concepto de socialización. Otro 
problema fundamental es la relación entre semántica y cuerpo, si bien la presencia más explícita 
del cuerpo en esta teoría se encuentra en el concepto de mecanismos o símbolos simbióticos. El 
último lugar donde esta investigación buscará una referencia corporal es en las emociones, las 
cuales fueron largamente ignoradas por Luhmann. También se explorarán abordajes alternativos 
como tratar al cuerpo como estructura, como medio o como entorno interno. 
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The aim of this paper is the analysis of the concept of “body” developed by Luhmann’s 
systems theory. In the last decades, the treatment devoted to the body by sociology and 
other near disciplines has thrived conspicuously, by the influence of multiple factors, 
which cannot be analyzed in this article
2
. In this study, the point of departure will be the 
“Cartesian” conception of the body, so as to observe to which extent this theory can 
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differentiate itself from the philosophical tradition, which until today exercises a strong 
ascendant. This will be useful to start to differentiate between the organism and the 
body, and state if the body can assume the category of system, as this theory interprets 
it. With the introduction of the delineation of several systems, the path to the analysis of 
the relationship between them will be smoothed, with the concept of interpenetration. It 
is in a particular sort of interpenetration, namely that between social system and the 
human being – which gave rise to the sphere of intimacy – where the most fundamental 
and general theses underlie, which this theory installs in order to understand the 
relationship between the body and the rest of the systems. Naturally, this work is not 
free from interpretations and ambiguities, as it is the question about the theoretical 
status attributable to the body. This core indeterminacy will launch many unanswered 
questions, for which there are no unequivocal answers. 
Other privileged places where one can look for the body are the feelings and 
emotions, and, in the context of the generalized symbolic media of communication, the 
symbiotic mechanisms. Lastly, as a conclusion, the departure point – the dualism 
between body and mind – will be picked up, so as to observe the possible criticism this 
posture implies.  
 
The official doctrine and systems theory 
 
According to HAHN and JACOB (1993), the luhmannian conception of the body or the 
body-mind relationship (or consciousness or psychic system, more appropriately for 
systems theory) entails no break up with the European thought tradition, emblematically 
headed by Descartes. In this sense, Luhmann reproduces, in other terms, the classic 
dualism between res cogitans and res extensa, now recycled under the systemic 
vocabulary. As it will be explained below without an apologetic spirit, but, on the 
contrary, avoiding polemics which tend to simplify the theoretical “adversaries”, it will 
be shown how, even if Luhmann continues to defend a clear differentiation between the 
psychic and the organic, it is unfair to maintain that his theory repurposes what, 
ironically, RYLE (2009) named the “official doctrine”. 
As this conception states, each human being has a body and a mind. On the one 
hand, bodies are provided of spatiality and, owing to this condition, they are subjected 
to the laws of mechanics, which govern all the bodies that inhabit the space. As a 
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consequence, processes and corporal states of the human being, as those of the rest of 
the bodies, will be examinable by external observers. On the contrary, minds do not 
inhabit space, and, therefore, they will not be submitted to the laws of mechanics. 
Moreover, in parallel opposition to bodies, mental processes will not be observable for 
external subjects, and for that reason only, each mind could recognize their own states 
and processes. Then, concludes Ryle, even if the human body is conceived as an engine, 
this engine or this machine is not comparable to any non-human engine or machine, as 
this would be governed by another internal engine. This conception is named by the 
English philosopher, with a pretty metaphor (or a sarcasm), “the dogma of the ghost in 
the machine”.  
A first observation that must be made is that systems theory, in contrast to the 
Cartesian conception of the world, which divides it into extension and thought, departs 
from the presupposition that there are systems
3
, and there are four types of them: 
organisms, psychic systems, social systems and machines. Each of these systems has 
the characteristic of performing only one operation: in the case of organic systems this 
will be life; in the psychic systems, attention
4
; and communication for social systems. In 
this context, it is imaginable that the body could be a sort of organic system; 
consequently, this theory would reintroduce, in a modern fashion and with more 
complex concepts, something similar to the outlines of Descartes. This notwithstanding, 
for systems theory, body is not a system, but, it would be a conglomerate of living 
systems, so the organism would be a symbiosis of numerous autopoietic systems with a 
general genetic program (1995d)
5
. Body will not be a system, as it would not perform 
any particular operation; on the contrary, there would be the different organic systems 
responsible for the performance of different types of operation, which allows the 
prosecution of the autopoiesis of life.  
It must also be emphasized that the biological is not considered, in this theory, as 
a mere machine subdued to the laws of the Newtonian mechanics. As a consequence, in 
this context, Luhmann introduces the vON FOERSTER’s (2003) distinction between trivial 
and non-trivial machines. The first ones are characterized by associating, in a 
                                                 
3
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5
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deterministic way, a certain input with an output. On the contrary, in the case of non-
trivial machines, an output is not based on the immediately preceding input, but that 
output would depend on a sequence of particular inputs, which can go back to a faraway 
past, just like an output also rooted in a remote past. This concept is bonded to the 
category of complex system, which encompasses organic, psychic and social systems. 
Complexity, for Luhmann, emerges as a result of the immanent limitation to the 
capacity of a system to couple in every moment, each element with each other (1984; 
1995c). This means that the system is coerced to select. As the elements or operations, 
which constitute every system, are temporal events – which, as soon as they appear, 
disappear – the system, in order to proceed with its autopoiesis, needs to continuously 
bind operations. Thus, the system must decide constantly, which operation will follow 
the other, so every selection is contingent, as each of them could have been different. 
The aforesaid is useful to show the radical differences that can be found, when 
one tries to understand the biological side of the body. If for the tradition – which 
conventionally finds its point of departure in Descartes – the corporeal element, even 
from the biological point of view, is understood as a mere mechanism, then even the 
biological is simplified in an excessive way, as it is reduced to pure mechanism, which 
obeys to the laws of mechanics. Therefore, this can be a first step in getting away from 
the tradition, “untrivializing” the organic.  
 
Interpenetration(s) 
 
The concept of interpenetration, as admits the very author, is explicitly taken from the 
works of Parsons, even if LUHMANN is not completely at ease with it, because of the 
prefix “inter” (2004). In subsequent publications to Social Systems, where the concept 
of interpenetration dominates, the German sociologist will introduce in a more frequent 
way the category of “structural coupling”, proceeding from the works of MATURANA 
and VARELA. In spite of this, in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997), LUHMANN 
still continues to talk about interpenetration and structural coupling, even though the use 
of the first one was reduced to the minimum. This means that during the years there is 
no complete process of substitution, as they are not completely interchangeable, because 
the difference lies in the fact that interpenetration will be interpreted as a particular case 
of structural coupling, specifically one in which there is co-evolution. 
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The concept of interpenetration, particularly in the case of the relationship between 
psychic and social systems, designates the situation where the systems enable each other 
by introducing their own already-constituted complexity into each other. Thus the 
receiver exercises a retroactive influence on the structures of the penetrator (1995c). 
Interpenetration is a permanent condition for psychic and social systems, so none of 
them can “disconnect” themselves from this relationship. What is more, this coupling is 
so radical, that they emerge in co-evolution; consequently, it would be senseless to ask 
which of the two preexists or originates the other.  
There is another sort of interpenetration, which exists between human beings, 
defining the last ones as the whole formed by the psychic system and the body. That 
interpenetration is called intimacy, which “comes into being when more and more 
domains of personal experience and bodily behavior become accessible and relevant to 
another human being and vice versa. This is possible only if double contingency is 
operationalized by personal attribution” (1995c: 224). Anyway, it must be taken into 
account that intimacy is a phenomenon that, historically, has increased, especially under 
the effect of functional differentiation. Concurrently, in this modern context of 
functional differentiation, there is an intensification of the personal individualization. 
Then, “only when this interest in the I-ness of personality has gained sufficient societal 
and cultural acceptance can the differentiation of intimate relations occur, in which 
everyone contributes what is most intimately his own and receives even better returns” 
(1995c: 225). Thus, it is clear that human interpenetration is only possible, because 
there is communication, as well as the human being a product of social interpenetration. 
These last remarks could cause one to think that interpenetration between human 
beings has no greater importance, due to the fact that, even the physical contact 
experiences would be significant as generated by society.  
Instead, intimacy includes what is incommunicable and therefore includes the 
experience of incommunicability. Alter is significant for ego in ways that ego cannot 
communicate to alter. Ego does not just lack words or the time for communication, nor 
is it a matter of sparing the other communication with which the other could not cope. 
Communication itself would give the utterance an unintended meaning, and because 
within the condition of intimacy one knows or feels this, one does not do it (1995c: 
228).  
 
This means that intimacy is an essentially paradoxical space. On the one hand, it is the 
result of social evolution; hence its meaning is socially generated through 
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communication. On the other hand, intimacy hosts the incommunicable and the socially 
formed experience of incommunicability. If one would like to communicate that 
experience, it would be necessary to transform it into information, which would turn on 
one of the three components of communication. As communication always requires an 
answer, positive or negative, and, because a lack of answer can be interpreted as an 
answer, in a domain prone to conflict, most of the times it is better to be still. This is a 
deeply socialized borderland, but, at the same time, it is impossible to describe it 
communicatively; it is one of the favorite spheres, where the body, beyond the mere 
organicity, becomes so particularly socially meaningful, that it turns out to be 
unutterable. 
  
Socialization 
 
Those premises allow one to take another step and get nearer to the concept of 
socialization, which is defined as the process through which, by means of 
interpenetration, the psychic system and the human being’s bodily behavior (controlled 
by the psychic system) is formed. One interpretation of this definition can be that 
socialization only forms the bodily behavior that the psychic system can control. As a 
result, all the psychic uncontrolled behavior would not be a product of socialization. In 
this sense, the body would not be capable of incorporating social meaning beyond what 
consciousness can observe. If this is accepted, this posture would be in opposition to the 
results of other theoretical and empirical research, like Pierre BOURDIEU’s (1980), who 
understands that the practical sense represents the social need turned into nature, to wit, 
converted into motor schemata and bodily automatisms. Bourdieu’s viewpoint, much 
more than Luhmann’s, is deeply anchored on MERLEAU-PONTY’s (2001) 
phenomenology, who understands that bodily manifestations are meaningful in 
themselves, so they are not an accompaniment or repercussion of conscious states. This 
is due to the fact that the body is intentional in itself, as intentionality precedes 
intelligence and allows the world to be experienced before being thought. 
Another aspect of this concept is that Luhmann states that socialization is always 
self-socialization, since there is no transmission of a meaning pattern (Sinnmuster) from 
one system to another, as this is an essentially self-referential process of a system that 
provokes and experiences socialization. This is a core point for the theory, not only 
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because it can imply an emphatic change with respect to traditional theories, which 
usually utilize the transmission metaphor, but also because here it is argued that only 
systems can “socialize”. This derives from the assumption that socialization is a self-
referential process, which is developed inside a system. The clearer consequence for the 
topic of this article is, as the body is not a system, this concept of socialization would 
refer, fundamentally, to psychic systems. The only way to think about a socialization 
process of the body without the conciousness’ intervention, implies the supposition that 
the diverse organic systems that compose the body – which does not operate in the 
medium of meaning – could produce some structural changes as a result of their 
exposition to the social. If one decides to assume that possibility, there are two 
fundamental difficulties. On the one hand, there is an epistemological obstacle of the 
very theory, which claims that the contact between social and organic systems is always 
mediated by the psychic system. As a consequence, to allow a direct contact between 
organism and society it would be necessary to break the hierarchical order of structural 
couplings. On the other side, it is of suspected sociological relevance to suppose that 
society can produce some sort of structural reorganization as a result of socialization
6
. 
Following BOURDIEU, what is most important for sociology on this topic is the bodily 
hexis, the given image of the body, the utilization of it. That is why it is of minor 
importance for sociology to study whether communication can produce any structural 
change in the digestive system. In this sense, for example, for FOUCAULT in the research 
contained in Histoire de la sexualité (1976), the possible evolutionary changes in the 
sexual organs are irrelevant, as his problem lies in the way bodies are disciplined. 
Although these contributions can be very valuable, they cannot provide a theoretical 
solution in the level of abstraction that handles systems theory. In this way, the lack of 
theoretical depth is covered by rhetorical figures and a flowery vocabulary, which can 
be useful to give a transitory answer, but they signal the need for further research in a 
theoretical answer. 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Every effort to think on the operative interference of society within any organic system would end in the 
destruction of one of the fundamental presuppositions of the theory: operative closure. Anyway, 
LUHMANN leaves open the possibility that sociocultural evolution could influence organic evolution 
(1995). Although, the author neither explains nor illustrates this scenario with an example.  
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The “use of the body” 
 
Returning to the sociological interest on the body, LUHMANN admits that his concern on 
this topic lies in “the everyday use of the body in social systems” (1995c: 245). 
Discussing a paragraph of George Mead, where the American philosopher states that 
gesture is the mechanism that allows the sequentiality of social order, Luhmann profits 
to introduce some reflections on the problem. To begin with, gesture does not explain 
anything, it would only give a name to the result. In the context of double contingency, 
specification is explained by the double specification; as a consequence, the 
specification of the potentiality of bodily behavior results from the given use. Thus, the 
body generates its own reduction of complexity. 
Approaching the problem with more specific social contexts, Luhmann claims 
that, today, corporeality is a general premise of social life. Hence, for this society, the 
difference corporeality / non-corporeality became socially irrelevant, as every human 
being presupposes to be the “inhabitant” of a body. In this also highly abstract sense, 
corporeality finds social relevancy as far as it becomes condition, opportunity and 
resource for the differentiation of social systems, at the same time that it can be a 
decisive premise for the bond operations of these systems. 
Making a brief historical analysis, Luhmann states that, throughout the 
civilization process – citing explicitly Norbert Elias – the body was reinforced and 
refined, as potential for gesture. The analysis of literary and scientific texts, especially 
from the 18th century, makes the author think that the emphasis and the theorization on 
gesture occupy the place of an absent psychology. On the contrary, the 19th century 
becomes witness to the expansion of psychology at the expense of rhetoric and gesture, 
a process which ends with the discovery of the unconscious. According to Luhmann, 
this has allowed the psychic to emancipate itself from the body / soul schema, resulting 
in a lack of value of the culture of the body as an indicator of psychic processes. Then, 
mutual interpenetration in social life oriented by the schema conscious / unconscious 
allows the inclusion of bodily behaviors as psychically steered.  
Regarding the use of the body in specific social contexts in modern society, 
Luhmann distinguishes three different situations. The first one refers to the possibility 
of an exact tuning and to a rhythm in the coordination of the behavior over corporeality, 
which is not possible under control of consciousness. The prototypical example of this 
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is dance. On the bases of the aforesaid, it is possible to make two observations. On the 
one hand, psyche, although Luhmann names the operative mode of psychic systems as 
“consciousness”, could function in a conscious and unconscious way. If this is admitted, 
it is highly difficult, especially at an empirical level, to try to determine which socially 
learnt bodily behavior is actually learnt through the unconscious intervention of the 
psychic system between body and social system, or if it is the body, which directly 
learns. On the other hand, the coordination of the different bodies, when movements are 
highly complex and rhythmic, is usually not possible to accomplish, if consciousness 
controls the process. This opens the possibility to think about a social behavior  – as far 
as socially learnt, but also because it implies the participation of more than a body – 
without the intervention of the psychic system. In this way, it can be concluded that it 
would be necessary to reformulate the definition of socialization, with the aim of 
clarifying the problem of the psychic control of the body, or to invent another term to 
designate the process through which the body learns certain social patterns. 
The second situation is sport. With respect to this, Luhmann states that it 
legitimates the behavior of its own body, through the meaning of the body itself, 
without the need to turn to external meaning spheres. The third social context makes 
reference to the symbiotic mechanisms, which will be analyzed later. 
 
Semantics and body 
 
Another polemic point corresponds to the relationship between social semantics and 
body. Here, the author claims that the semantics of the body influence indisputably the 
bodily feeling and the body usage. At the same time, it is related to the change of forms 
in the sociocultural evolution, as the body is included in the interpenetration between 
human beings and social systems. From the theory of social systems, which finds its 
definitive formulation in Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft (1997), it is understood that 
societal structure conditions and gives the possibility of the construction of self-
descriptions in society, about the society itself, which condense into a semantic. On the 
contrary, it is not admissible that semantics transform societal structures. So, now the 
reader can wonder what the body really is: A societal structure? Or a mere semantic 
construction of society? The first definition given at the beginning of this work, 
according to which the body is understood as a conglomerate of organic systems, is 
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theoretically ambiguous enough, as to generate big problems. Firstly, it affirms that the 
body is not a system and, especially, not an organic one. As it is known, the Luhmann’s 
operative constructivism begins with the statement that there are systems, and these 
perform operations that have a temporally limited duration. The operativity of the 
systems would be a sort of “empiric basis” of the theory. Then, if the body is not a 
system, it would not have its own operativity, so it would not develop structures. But, if 
the body is not a system, would it be a semantic construction of society? The mere fact 
of distinguishing the human body from the rest of the organic world is also an 
achievement of the self-descriptive evolution of society, in the same way as it was for 
the case of the psychic system’s individualization and independization with respect to 
the body. Although, this would not indicate that the psychic system is a mere semantic 
formula, without operative ground. In the same way, it is conceivable that the body isn't 
either. 
The other mentioned alternative makes reference to the possibility of 
considering the body as structure. For Luhmann’s systems theory, the concept of 
structure makes no allusion, necessarily, to something material, to some sort of 
framework or skeleton that maintains the system united. Otherwise, the function of 
structure, in a system as complex as society, is to make feasible the autopoietic 
reproduction from event to event, restricting the field of possibilities of connection from 
element to element. In the context of social systems, as all its elements (or operations) 
are events, this means that structures are temporalized, so they assume the form of 
expectations. Owing to the fact that structures exist only as present in each moment and 
as they make reference to something expectable, they are resistant to time. Regrettably, 
Luhmann does not go forward in the analysis of another sort of structure apart from the 
social structures, as it would be difficult to understand that the body would be a 
structure, at least in these terms. If one understands that the body is a structure, it would 
be necessary to determine the selectivity of which type of system it limits (that of the 
organic, the social or the psychic systems). Regarding the organism, it should be 
considered, whether it is each organ, inserted in a specific system, or if it is the whole 
body, which limits the selectivity. Anyway, this discussion does not substantially 
concern sociology, given that if the body was a structure only useful for organic 
systems, it would have no sociological relevance. If, as much psychic systems as social 
systems, the body presents itself as a set of movement capacities, it would be more 
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correct to think about it as a medium, namely, as a set of loosely coupled elements. In 
this way, the body can work as the most primitive communication medium, through 
gesture. But, at the same time, socialization would limit or expand this movement 
potential, reducing or increasing the number of available combinations. A clear example 
of this is provided by MAUSS’ (1936) study on the body, where the French 
anthropologist indicates that in many western countries people have lost the capability 
to crouch, something that kids in those countries or adults in other latitudes can do. In 
this sense, the permanent interpenetration situation, in which the body takes part, may 
amplify or reduce the movement range of the joints, the extension of the muscles, as 
well as conditioning the posture and the bodily hexis in general. Nevertheless, to 
characterize the body as a medium would be not enough, since the psychic system can 
also be interpreted as medium for society (1995e).  
Another alternative to conceptualize the body can be found if one understands it 
as the internal environment of the organic systems. This concept of internal 
environment is utilized in the theory of society to characterize the “public”, conceived 
as the internal environment of all the sub-systems of society (1988; 2000; 2009), which 
emerges from the differentiation of the system with respect to its environment. This 
process also implies the reproduction of the difference between system and environment 
inside the system. In this way an internal environment emerges to the system itself, 
which is domesticated and specified, thanks to the existence of external limits to the 
general system (1988). Examples of this for the sub-systems of society are the market 
for economy (1988) and the public opinion for politics (2000). Even if the 
aforementioned conglomerate of organic systems does not constitute an all-
encompassing system, it can be thought that the body constitutes this internal 
environment to all these systems, which is constituted by the participation of all of 
them, but which is not identified with either of them. Going a bit afar, this formulation 
can be completed with the idea that the different organic systems, through diverse 
performances (Leistungen) would help the autopoietic reproduction of the body in its 
entirety, as a result of the accomplishment of their functions. 
From all this it can be concluded that the body does not constitute a structure, 
even though it can be thought as a medium for social and psychic systems. This means 
that there is no risk to contradict one of the fundamental postulates of the theory, that is, 
that semantics can never determine the structure. Referring to the usage of the body, in 
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principle, it must be accepted that the body becomes socially relevant only if it 
communicates or helps to communicate something. Then, the communicatively relevant 
corporeality is tied, through interpenetration, to the communicative operation being 
carried out. This also includes the situations in which it is thinkable that somebody, due 
to his/her dress style, his/her postures or gesture, is indicating something, even if he/she 
has no intention to do that
7
. While a psychic or a social system can distinguish between 
utterance and information, there will be communication. If these considerations are 
right, it would be difficult for the very systems theory to accept that semantics can 
influence the fulfillment of the communicative operation. This is due to the fact that, if 
one really admits that socialization is always self-socialization, namely, that there is no 
transmission of information, semantics has no way to affect the decisions of a system on 
the ways that it has to behave with respect to its body. 
Notwithstanding this, the doubt around the problem of the relationship between 
semantics and structure is amplified, when LUHMANN in Love as Passion (1982) 
suggests that the semantic tradition of amour passion and romantic love have favored 
the differentiation of the system of the intimate relations. The author protects himself 
saying that a retrospective survey would be necessary to observe to what extent this was 
possible. 
To finish with the semantic problems, probably the most perturbing 
interpretation is to consider the body as only an observational unit. This vision can be 
grounded on the definition of the body as a conglomerate of organic systems. In this 
sense, the unity of the body is only given by the observer, who attributes limits, which 
do not correspond to the limits of a system. For consciousness, the body is that unit that 
allows itself to differentiate itself from the environment and also to locate others in the 
world. With the bodily experience, consciousness can identify what belongs to it and 
what does not (1995d), and consciousness develops from the first moment identifying it 
with the body (1995a). Nevertheless, adds Luhmann, the identification with the body 
fails, because the body is only given as a form, namely as a difference (in a spencer-
brownian sense). But this does not prevent thinking that the body would be a semantic 
                                                 
7
 This communicative potential of the body is related to one of the foundations of Le Breton’s (1992) 
sociology of the body, which states that the body, as much emitter as receiver, produces meaning con-
stantly. Anyway, the place given to the body as a potential communication medium in Luhmann’s theory 
is minimal, as he privileges the analysis of speech, writing, print, and the generalized symbolic media of 
communication. In this sense, this theory can only provide quite rudimentary tools to a sociology centered 
on the body analysis, even when it works as a communication medium. 
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product, a construction of an observer. In a certain way, this understanding can have 
some relationship with the lacanian conception of the body. According to SOLER (1984) 
one is not born with a body, but one constructs it. To do so, in a first lacanian 
interpretation, one needs a living organism and an image. In this way one needs to 
attribute to the unity of the image the feeling of the unity of the body. This unity is 
given by a visual Gestalt and it is seized by the subject from the unity of his form in the 
mirror. In a subsequent period, Lacan interprets that as the signifier, which introduces 
the discourse in the organism. This means also that, as subjects of the signifier, we are 
separated from the body. Without going into the details, which can mark deep 
differences between the two theories, the main coincidence is, first, the difference 
between the organism, which is given, and the body, which is constructed through a 
“linguistic” activity, let us say. In addition, the psyche perceives the distance between it 
and the body. On the other hand, for both authors this does not mean that the body is a 
mere illusion, a phantasm. As was previously shown, Luhmann still talks about a lived 
body and feelings associated to it. 
 
Symbiotic mechanisms 
 
Once communication becomes a process (1995c), it faces three improbabilities: that ego 
understands what alter expects (solved through language); that communication arrives 
to more people than those present (solved through the media of dissemination: writing, 
printing and electronic broadcasting); that ego accepts and takes into account alter’s 
communication. This last situation is solved thanks to the generalized symbolic media 
of communication (GSMC), which transforms the probability of a “no” into a “yes”, 
producing a highly improbable combination of selection and motivation. Their function 
is to ensure that ego’s expectations will turn into premises for alter’s selections. They 
are truth, love, power/law and property/money
8
 (1997). To each of them corresponds a 
symbiotic mechanism: perception for truth; sexuality for love; physical violence for 
power (within the limits of law); necessities for property and money.  
These symbiotic symbols or mechanisms order the way in which communication 
lets itself be irritated by the body, namely, the way in which the effects of the structural 
                                                 
8
 Previously (1995b), LUHMANN had also included (in a rudimentary form) religious belief, art and basic 
values, although it seems that he was not convinced with that decision. 
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coupling are processed in a communication system without breaking the system’s 
closure and without the need to resort to a non-communicative operation (1997). In this 
way, the function of these social devices is to make possible the activation and steering 
of certain organic resources, at the same time that it gives them a socially manageable 
form to the organic irritations (1981). It must be stressed that in the article 
“Symbiotische Mechanismen” (1981), which appeared in 1974, the word “body” is 
never utilized. It only talks about the organic. This changes clearly with Social Systems, 
from 1984, and Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, from 1997. In these texts the 
symbiotic mechanisms or symbols are tied to the corporeality and not to the organism. 
It is not clear how this slight but very significant change must be interpreted. 
On another side, it must be underlined that the differentiation of the GSMC also 
entails the parallel differentiation of the symbiotic mechanisms, so that the reference to 
the corporeal becomes highly specific and is limited to the important aspects. In this 
sense, the symbiotic mechanisms could function, until a certain point, without the 
necessity of the corresponding corporeal process, as there is also the case of corporeal 
events that show no social importance; consequently they are ignored. As a result, the 
interpenetration between human being and social system, which entailed a highly 
abstract coupling, becomes more concrete with this concept. Nevertheless, it must not 
be forgotten that this is only a punctual case under which the interpenetrative bond is 
presented, with which the generality continues to be necessary for the description of the 
other communications, which do not use GSMC. 
Delving into the problem of interpenetration between human beings and social 
systems under the application of GSMC, Luhmann states that organic processes are 
conditioned by these mechanisms, without arriving to determine the factual existence of 
these processes. This conditioning, which in the language of systems theory can sound 
dangerous, simply means that: physical violence must be applied according to the code 
of power, only under circumstances defined by law; perception provides truth, under the 
high requirements of the reigning science, only when it answers to a theoretically 
relevant question; in a highly developed economy, the satisfaction of the needs, under 
the assumption of scarce resources, is only possible, if one can pay for the desired 
products; the interminglement in a sexual relationship is conditioned by previous 
communications, testified by love (1981). 
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Emotions 
 
Emotions can be another place, where one can look for a corporeal reference in this 
theory, but, at least in Luhmann’s version, it is not so. Regarding the luhmannian 
conception of emotions, the only explicit appearance of this concept is in the seventh 
chapter of Social Systems (1995c), where it is explained that the expectations of the 
psychic systems can condense into claims. The latter must be counterbalanced. In a 
stratified society this happens through the possibility to deduce pretensions from the 
merits tied to the social stratus. In contrast, in a functional differentiated society money 
is the one responsible for the transference of merits to claims. On the other hand, claims 
put into play the distinction between fulfillment and disappointment in a way that 
emotions would work as processes of internal adaptation. As psychic systems can 
launch their claims without much ground, this exposes them to their own emotions if 
claims do not become routine.  As a consequence, modern society would be exposed to 
the risk of emotionality, in a diametrically opposed way to the weberian fear of the 
extinction of emotions under the realm of rationality. As individuals cannot ground their 
expectations in merits, but just only in themselves, these are compelled to produce self-
descriptions, as a result: 
[...] the individual is forced to produce reflections and self-presentations (which can 
never be ‘accurate’). One encounters difficulties in doing this, looks for assistance, and 
develops the additional claim to a comprehensible, if not therapeutic, treatment of one’s 
claims. This last claim to assistance in grounding claims is so absurd that it is as easy to 
accept as to reject (1995c: 270).  
 
As it can be observed, emotions would be an emergent element opposite to situations of 
disappointment of claims, so they are not psychic components that intervene constantly 
in the autopoiesis of consciousness. On the other hand, Luhmann seems to dismiss that 
disappointment of expectations, which do not condense into claims, could generate 
emotions, which is not very believable. In the journal Soziale Systeme's first issue of 
2004, a discussion on this problematic point of the Luhmann’s systems theory is 
proposed, beginning with Luc CIOMPI’s (2004) criticism. This author indicates that the 
problem of emotions constitutes a blind spot for Luhmann’s theory. 
From the 80’s, CIOMPI (1988) was working in the relationship between affect 
and cognition from a systems theory, trying to conciliate the developments of Piaget 
and Freud in those fields. In that study it was emphasized that affectivity as much as 
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cognition matures in phases that only partially overlap, consequently the progress in an 
area provides the bases for the development in another. Affectivity will acquire the form 
of energy, while cognition that of structure. On another side, affectivity represents the 
basic means of communication between living creatures, at the same time that cognitive 
functions remain in the background for a long time. This brings the Swiss psychologist 
to conceive of the psyche as a sort of double system, built by two components: the 
emotional one will be anchored in material, physical and concrete phenomena, which 
are directly tied to perception and action; while the intellectual and cognitive 
component differentiates the structures grounded on the biological and sensoriomotor 
realm. When both components are in harmony, they strengthen and validate each other, 
but when there is disharmony, both refute and enfeeble themselves, generating an 
uncomfortable tension, a state of uncertainty and anxiety, so that there is a disagreement 
in the totality of the body-mind system. Here Ciompi intends that emotions imply a 
“dialog” between body and psyche, so they are not merely psychic episodes. In 
Luhmann’s theory, this could have been interpreted with the concept of structural 
coupling and irritation, as seen in the case of the symbiotic mechanisms. In spite of this, 
Luhmann seems to ignore that the body could trigger any emotion, considering them 
only as a result of the disappointment of claims. As a consequence, this concept of 
emotion lacks any bodily anchorage.  
On the other hand, STENNER (2004) plays down the critical vision of Ciompi 
with respect to Luhmann’s ideas, indicating that the last author’s theory is not 
completely alexithymic, but it is based on a cognitivist vision of the problem. Stenner’s 
interpretation differs from Ciompi’s one, as he understands emotions as “threshold 
phenomena”, since they exist neither completely inside, nor outside social, psychic and 
organic systems. The author adds that emotions form a “parasitical coupling” between 
organism and psyche, so they will manifest themselves organically as affects, while 
these affects will take the form of different subjective forms in consciousness 
(emotions). In this way, affects will generate consciousness, by means of the stimulation 
of different organic regions, but emotions will also “become directly amenable to 
conscious control, cultivation, manipulation and socialization” (CIOMPI 2004: 172). As 
a result, consciousness will be composed of a combination of affects into more complex 
compounds with new emergent dynamics. In spite of this, emotions will also be part of 
social systems, so they would play a communicative role that increasingly frees from 
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organic and conscious limits, which continuously provide proto-communicative 
potential. Stenner’s proposal, in a certain sense, comes to compensate the lack in 
Luhmann’s theory remarked in the previous paragraph, with his interpretations of 
emotions as threshold phenomena. What must be stressed from Stenner’s position is 
that he eliminates any reference to the body, and substitutes it with the organism. As it 
has been seen, they are not synonyms. On another side, treating the body as a medium 
can also be seen as considering it a threshold phenomenon. The problem with the 
threshold in this theory is always the operative reference. To solve this problem, 
following Stenner, affects must be considered as a sort of performance (if not an 
operation) of the organic system, and emotions as an operation of consciousness or as a 
process which implies attention processing — so as to incorporate them into the 
operativity of the consciousness. In this way, the “threshold” characteristic of emotions 
is solved into the operativity of these two systems. What remains unanswered is the 
place of the body itself in this debate. 
More recently, RIESE (2011) has outlined her dissent with the aforesaid, 
indicating that emotions do not need to be consciously perceived, nor do they need to be 
the other side of organic affects. This means that they can be psychic phenomena 
without external trigger, or psychic reports provoked by perturbations coming from 
society. In this sense, as psychic systems depend on social systems for their own 
autopoiesis, the first ones develop emotional reactions referred to the perceived level of 
viability of the second ones. This means that emotions indicate whether the structures of 
the social systems are viable or not for the prosecution of the psychic and organic 
autopoiesis. On another side, the function of the emotions with respect to organic 
systems is to ensure the autopoiesis of these ones, coupling themselves to psychic 
systems and inducing them to act in a way that can help the organism. Finally, Riese 
understands that psychic systems can experiment positive emotions when their 
expectations are fulfilled or they act in accordance with some values, while negative 
emotions signal the violation or omission of those values. Consequently, emotions 
could be the symbiotic mechanism of values, which, in some of Luhmann’s writings, 
are conceived as a generalized symbolic medium of communication. With this proposal, 
Riese extends Stenner’s analysis, emphasizing the psychic side of the phenomenon, 
completely obliterating the reference to the body. Only a little reference to the organism 
remains, when she states that emotions ensure its autopoiesis. But what these 
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theorizations systematically ignore is, following Ciompi, the fact that emotions are not 
isolated episodes in psychic life, but constant ones. 
These reflections show the complexity of the problem of emotions and the 
difficulty of its seizure. Even simplifying the arguments to the extreme, it is difficult to 
take only one decision and place emotions in only one domain, whether it was the 
psychic, the bodily or the social. Nevertheless, what seems more convincing is the 
impossibility to think about emotions, feelings and/or affects as mere isolated episodes 
that work as alarms in case of disappointment, as Luhmann expects to do. Much more 
persuasive is Ciompi’s point of view, since he interprets the affective component as 
constantly operating next to the cognitive one, despite the fact that it can go unnoticed 
(or ignored). In any case, these considerations do not provide any robust reflection on 
the body and, sometimes, as in Stenner’s and Riese’s case, only its organic aspect is 
contemplated.  
  
Discussion: Body – Psyche Dualism 
 
As a conclusion, it is possible to return to the initial point, so as to reconsider the 
concept of body, which is expounded here. As has remained clear, Luhmann proposes a 
dualist, or better, a threefold schema, since he understands that there are three types of 
systems differentiated by their operative modes. These three systems are in a constant 
relationship of interpenetration. With respect to the Cartesian conception, the 
differences that distance systems theory from it have been remarked, although the 
similarity with reference to the dualism psychic-body system persists. In spite of the 
fact that Luhmann renounces explicitly any research that tries to find the essence of 
these two systems, the concepts of emergence and meaning mark a clear distinction 
between the organic and the psychic, preventing any reductionism, which would attempt 
to explain the psychic through the brain operations, or behavior through the genetic trait 
of a human being. The difference between these diverse “reality orders” guarantees the 
exclusion of any reductionism, but, for some, it installs completely artificial 
compartmentalizations. In this sense, BUNGE (2010), against every dualism, stands for a 
materialist monism; therefore, that which philosophy has called “mind” would be 
reducible to brain operations. Some of the reasons that the author gives to abandon 
dualism are that: this is irrefutable, as it is impossible to manipulate something non-
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material; it is inconsistent with cognitive etiology, which demonstrates that the human 
being shares some mental abilities with other animals; it violates the laws of physics, 
since it goes against the principle of conservation of energy, etc. Paradoxically, a 
conception like this is the first to reproduce the Cartesian simplifications with respect to 
the body, considering it as a machine, now steered by the brain, which is the one which 
thinks, feels, perceives, etc. In Bunge’s conception, materiality would be ensured by the 
facticity of organic processes of the diverse bodily organs, as this was something given 
in itself. As well remembers BUTLER, from a foucauldian perspective, the body 
materiality is given by “a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce 
the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface” (BUTLER 1993: 9). But this process must 
always be thought of as an effect of a power that is regularly exercised. From this 
perspective, FOUCAULT (1994) affirms that bodies do not exist as mere biological or 
material items, but they exist within and through a political system, while LE BRETON 
(1992) will say that these do not exist in a natural state, but only inserted in the weave 
of meaning. From a very different viewpoint, systems theory also renounces to every 
apriorism, which expects to establish some “in itself” prior to any social experience 
capable of describing it. The concept of co-evolution implied in the interpenetration 
relationship indicates that neither the corporeal, nor the psychic, nor the social are 
thinkable and they cannot exist in isolation. 
Returning to Foucault, it seems that the French philosopher proposes no clear 
monist conception, but neither a dualist one. Maybe a bit ironically, FOUCAULT (1975) 
talks about the difference between body and soul, interpreting the last one as the result 
of punitive, of surveillance and coercion procedures, namely, an element where the 
effects of a certain type of power and a reference to a knowledge are articulated. As a 
result, soul would not be more than a piece in the domain that power exercises over the 
body. This strong stress on the domination of power over the bodies (and souls), would 
make one think of a unidirectional relationship, incompatible with the idea of co-
evolution. On the other hand, there are two more problems strictly related to the 
aforementioned. The first one makes reference to the form that assumes the relation, 
since, in principle, for Foucault, the fundamental relationship is that between body and 
power, which generates the emergence of the soul, which would be a way of 
interiorizing the power itself. This makes thinking that the psychic raises only as an 
effect of power, which is social, on a body, therefore power would be temporally 
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previous. Moreover, renouncing to an ontological way of understanding the soul (as 
also the body), in addition to the irony of talking about a soul, it is not clear if the author 
would be playing with the reader, so to destabilize his ontological surenesses, or if he 
really means the aforesaid. With respect to this point, systems theory is soberer and, 
also giving up ontology, states the existence of psychic systems, as these perform 
operations. This means that the psychic cannot be understood as a mere illusion, but 
neither as a pure social product. Additionally, Luhmann rejects an all encompassing 
conception of power —even though he interprets it from a relational point of view—, so 
as to understand it as a GSMC. In this sense, while Foucault emphasizes the importance 
of the body, Luhmann prioritizes the analysis of the psychic, largely ignoring and 
giving no clear place to the body, sometimes confused with the organic systems. 
A more concrete critique against any dualism is presented by ELIAS (1991; 
1994), considering that the difference between individual and society is purely artificial, 
since these would be two sides of the same phenomenon, that is the human being. This 
differentiation would be a historical product, which, in the West, becomes archetypical 
with the emergence of the homo clausus conception, in which he would be isolated from 
the external world and from the other human beings, by invisible walls. This would be 
the unquestioned fundament of many philosophical and sociological theories. 
Nevertheless, for Elias, this division would not be possible without a firmer, more 
universal and more regular contention of affects. In this way, developing the concepts 
on an empirical basis, it would be evident that both are processes and not isolated 
essences. If one accepts this conception, it would be necessary to finish with 
disciplinary differentiation, founded on a simple ghost, which ends by distorting the real 
meaning of things. As a result, it would not be very fruitful to continue wondering 
abstractly, as in this work, on the relationship between body, psyche and society, as this 
is solved simply in empirical research. Naturally, this quite naive hint with respect to 
the solutions that empirical research would contribute seems to be, at least, arguable. 
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